Between 1950 and 1970, the ownership of some of the largest business conglomerates in India changed from British to Indian hands. Almost without exception, the firms formerly under the management of the conglomerates saw bankruptcy, nationalization, and fall in corporate ranking. In Indian business history scholarship, this episode is under-researched, even though hypotheses on the transfer-cumdecline exist. Combining new sources with conventional ones, the paper revisits the episode, and suggests revisions to the current hypotheses.
5 present some similarities. Both sets, for example, suffered due to an unusually violent trade union activity in Calcutta. However, the two processes also differed. The IndoBritish firms and the MNCs differed in the nature of their business, the former being more export-oriented and the latter more domestic-market-oriented. Further, the problems the former faced had begun earlier and apparently originated in transfer of control. A possible link between transfer of control and performance is of direct interest to the present paper. It is likely that the decline of the Indo-British firms contributed to trade union violence of the later years, and spilled over into the decline of the British MNCs in Calcutta. But this is only a plausible speculation.
Interest in the subject derives from five larger issues concerning postindependence economic transition in India, Britain, and Asia. First, the occurrence of transfer and decline together raises the question, was there a causal connection between transfer and decline? In corporate folklore of Calcutta it is often said that transfer of control led to asset-stripping and drain of cash resources from otherwise healthy companies. The court case evidence presents credible suggestions that this did happen, though the scale of the process cannot be established. The paper, however, argues that even without outright and deliberate mismanagement, the firms became vulnerable because the transfer process increased uncertainty about the future in all sorts of ways.
Secondly, the episode formed part of a dramatic change in the composition of industrial entrepreneurship in India after independence, raising the question: did business culture change as a result of reconfiguration of capital, and did that influence performance? The transfer process offered an extraordinary chance for mobility to eastern India's largest commercial group, the Marwari traders and bankers. "Marwari" applies to a loose group of capitalists who came to Calcutta from western India (the Marwar region to be precise). 6 Their main business was banking. From this foundation they diversified into commodity trade and share broking around the turn of the twentieth century. 7 With exceptions like Ghanshyamdas Birla, Badridas Goenka, Ramkrishna Dalmia, and Lakshmipat Singhania, few Marwari houses had either become industrial houses or showed an inclination to move in that direction before independence. By 1965, however, over a third of the industrial conglomerates of India 6 was Marwari-owned and based in Calcutta. Two of these (Bangur and Surajmull Nagarmull) had risen to prominence almost entirely owing to acquisitions of British firms, and a third (Singhania of Calcutta and Kanpur) had taken significant part in the transfer process.
8 A yet fourth Marwari group from western India, Dalmia Jain, had greatly added to their assets through acquisitions. 9 That these changes wrought a deep transformation in Calcutta's business culture cannot be disputed, but the exact nature of the change and its effects on firm performance have not been researched at all.
Thirdly, could the state do more the safeguard shareholder capital in these firms? More broadly, what role if any did politics play? Indeed, the transfer-cumdecline process should figure in assessments of the developmental state that took shape in the 1950s, because there was a serious attempt by the state to create a new capitalistic order. Because the new business environment was political in origin, a systematic study of this episode offers insight into the effort to remodel capitalism by a new nation state. In other words, the state may have been biased in its treatment of capitalists, favouring some and leaving other exposed to a new challenges with fewer means left at their disposal. Regulatory law may have fallen behind these upheavals. I
suggest that both these syndromes materialized.
Fourth, the transfer process changed the complexion of the premier business city of India in 1950, namely Calcutta. Once a major hub of international business, Calcutta experienced a fall of the top companies based in the city, and with the attrition of foreign firms, the city de-globalized, "Indianized," and de-industrialized after 1947. That there was a costly deindustrialization in Calcutta is a well-established fact within a large scholarship that explores the economic decline of West Bengal state. 10 The scholarship does not sufficiently acknowledge the role of corporate enterprise in the process, and underestimates the opportunity cost of the transfer of corporate control in the city. Calcutta failed to play any worthwhile role in the reemergent Asian trade, as it had done a century before. Between 1950 and 1970, 8 
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Singapore and Hong Kong attracted a great deal of the mobile international capital in trade and services working in the region. The retreat of international business ruled Calcutta out as a potential destination for mobile capital. The impression is confirmed when we see that some of the firms that left Calcutta invested money elsewhere. The expansion of the tea industry in East Africa, for example, was helped by firms contracting their Calcutta operations. were an integral part of mid-twentieth century ethnic nationalisms in Asia, and that these episodes influenced the trajectory of capitalism both in the countries of origin and in the regions of destination of fugitive capital. To one interested in these dispersal processes, as well as one interested in the effect of the attrition on the subsequent evolution of capitalism in the "home" countries, the paper may have some interest.
The paper addresses the first of these four issues, was there a causal connection between transfer and decline? The main obstacle to researching the episode so far has been the scarcity of documentary sources. Fujian-Singapore Trade, 1920 -1960 , Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010 Catherine Schenk, "The Economic History of Hong Kong", EH-Net. https://eh.net/encyclopedia/economic-history-of-hong-kong/ (accessed on 21 October 2015). 16 The websites of the surviving firms offer little or no information on their heritage. A pleasant exception is the Assam Company, see http://www.assamco.com/.
normally end around 1960, and talk about the process if the transfer was negotiated, and then in a sanitized way. The obstacle can be overcome to some extent by making a systematic use of the business papers stored in the British archives. The task is daunting in itself. Further, the coverage therein of the 1950s and 1960s is uneven. The confidential reports and proceedings of chambers of commerce representing the interests of British firms, and reports published in newspapers and business journals of the time, are also promising and remain little used for the purpose. But these are more informative on the environment than on the firms themselves.
Pending a future project to use all available material to the fullest extent possible, the present article makes use of another resource, judgments of Indian High
Courts in cases concerning transferred firms. The judicial cases are useful first because these often did outline a narrative history of the firms. Given the fact that there was little either in the public or the private domain describing the mechanism or the intention behind transfers, the judges and lawyers were constrained to reconstruct a story from witness statements. In the judgments, therefore, we come as close to contemporary testimony as we possibly can today. The court cases are also valuable to show where law stopped short. They show the border between legality and illegality in the actions of the parties, and acceptable behaviour and malfeasance in the conduct of the state officers in charge of protecting shareholder interests. The cases show that in many instances the border was drawn after transfers had occurred.
It is useful to begin with a statement of the main conclusions of the paper. I make two broad generalizations based on the material surveyed. First, whereas business historians have sometimes projected the transfer-cum-decline as a failure of the foreign capitalists to adapt to new India, I will suggest that post-independence India created a business environment that was incompatible with their survival. A key element in their operation, open factor markets, was more or less destroyed by the Indian state; and scope for opportunistic capture of assets was created by failure of law, adverse regulation, and political sentiment. My second generalization is offered in partial qualification of the above. I suggest that the manner of transfer and subsequent restructuring reveals differentiation between firms and groups. One story does not fit all firms. In particular, there were significant if exceptional cases of positive adaptation after transfer, which should alert us against taking a "decline" narrative for granted.
The rest of the paper is divided into four sections. The next section discusses historiography and the sources used for the present paper. The two sections that follow present a chronological account of the cases of transfer of control and show differences between industry and time. The fourth section interprets the evidence, with particular reference to the major factor -state policy -external to the firms. The last section concludes with a few remarks on how factors internal to firms and factors external to them interacted in the process of transfer and led to a varied outcome
HISTORIOGRAPHY
In business history scholarship, the retreat-cum-decline of Indo-British firms has been explained with reference to two types of causes. One of these can be called internal, that is, specific to the firms and the people who managed them, and another external, or specific to the environment. Furthermore, there are three varieties of internal explanations, which refer to managerial conservatism, loss of market power due to the Great Depression, and transfer of ownership of industrial firms from manufacturers to traders.
The first set of explanations blames the managers and owners for not being Neither the endogenous decline nor the external inducement thesis is completely satisfactory, however. To begin with, none of the studies cited above presents a systematic account covering the years when the transfer-cum-decline peaked -the 1950s and 1960s -using evidence specific to these times and the firms in question. Secondly, problems exist with all of these explanations. Take managerial conservatism. Conservative is a strange epithet to apply to firms that had been around for over a century, and which started their enterprise at a time when trade, agency and information costs were very high. 28 Moreover, British conservatism would be acceptable as a theory of transfer if after transfer to Indians, the firms improved performance. In fact, they went bankrupt quickly after transfer.
Episodic explanations -by which I mean attribution of decline to two things, the Depression and/or independence -do not convince either. The British Empire was no doubt a crucial factor to the profitability of these firms because the empire held episodes that are best described as shock acquisitions, a type of transfer which left the owners, managers, the state, and the judicial system unprepared to cope.
II. 1943-60: SHOCK ACQUISITIONS
The Great Depression left most trading firms in a weaker position than before.
The Partition of India was again bad news for the jute industry, because the jute cultivation zone went to East Pakistan. Inland navigation was affected adversely. An illustrative case is the Rivers Steam Navigation Company managed by Macneill and
Barry (see Appendix for details on selected managing agency houses). The company saw a great deal of its custom and some of its assets lost, first due to the Partition, and later, the India-Pakistan war of 1965.
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Along with these specific problems, there was a more general one. The
Government of India wanted the companies to do more to Indianize both shareholding and senior managerial cadre. Exchange control policy announced in 1947 directed foreign firms to divest up to 25 per cent of the shareholding. The order induced some firms to recruit Indian partners, and others to look for ways to reduce Indian operations. The process was carried out in a hurry, and rather like a forced marriage, may have pushed some owners towards making alliances with individuals they did not totally trust. In this scenario, the border between friendly partnership and predatory takeover was not distinct. Some companies did become defunct because of the Partition and the World War. 35 More generally, all had their defences down.
There were a series of high profile takeover bids. The firms targeted consisted of two segments, a managing agency company usually formed of a partnership, and a string of companies managed by the agency, where the agency firm had varying stake. 34 The company came into the Inchcape group in 1960, with which the Government of India entered an agreement. The Government purchased shares in the company, but already the crisis had driven the managing agent Macneill and Barry into a financial crisis. 35 A telling case is that of the British Burma Petroleum Co. Ltd. The company carried on the business of prospecting for, refining, producing and dealing in petroleum and other mineral oils in Burma from its inception in 1910 to 1942. In the beginning of March 1942, the British pulled out of Burma and Japanese forces occupied the territory. Before pulling out the British army blew up and destroyed the installations of the company as a part of its scorched earth policy. The company claimed compensation for the loss from the British Government. But before any money was paid, the British Parliament passed the War Damage Act, 1965, abolishing the right to compensation. Between 1942 and 1965 the company carried on no business. In 1965, one Jagdish Kapadia, shareholder, gathered a number of proxies and ousted the owners from the board. With the cash reserves of the company, the Kapadia group acquired the shares of National Rayon Corporation Ltd. and Killick Industries Ltd. The Killick Industries Ltd., in turn, were the managing agents of about seven other companies and had a few more companies as subsidiaries. British Burma, however, was a special case. Rajan Nagindas Doshi and another. vs British Burma Petroleum Co. Ltd. 30 June 1971.
Since the agency contract ensured control, the agency firm did not usually worry about the level of stake. There were two common strategies in the takeover process.
An individual would buy shares to become the director of a managing agency firm, thus gaining indirect control of firms managed by the agency. The more common strategy was to buy a controlling stake in a managed company, and then influence the board to change the managing agency contract in favour of a firm controlled by the new owner. Both of these routes required the person taking over to have close ties with stock-brokers.
The spate of acquisitions in this time had five other features that deserve notice: (1) not all transfers were hostile; (2) all transfers required the transferee to command liquid wealth or substantial credit in the informal money market, which made the Calcutta's Marwaris well placed; (3) when hostile, transfers generated conflicts within the board, and among rival shareholders or rival bidders; (4) whether hostile or mutual, transfers in the 1950s tended to involve firms that were already vulnerable by the war and/or showed signs of a lack of resolve to carry on in India;
and (5) there was no documentary evidence of change in business policy after the transfer of control, but hints towards that effect abound. The visible effect of transfer was movement of cash wealth from one firm to another. This strengthens the hypothesis that the decline owed to developments after transfer, and had no prehistory.
The stock market side of the transaction played an important role in Calcutta.
In almost all cases, the acquisition was done via front companies that did sharebroking, so that the transaction itself could be made to look like a routine investment by a broker firm rather than a takeover bid. On several occasions, the purchase was done at above market price, and the sale to the person instigating the takeover was done at below the market price. The resultant loss was shown as a capital loss by the broking firm. This procedure drew the adverse attention of the income tax commissioners. The judicial process disallowed the tax credit but let the broking firm By then the allegation that Mundhra drained the cash reserves of one company to buy up another recurred too often. In one of these cases, it turned out, that shares of a group company were pledged to the Life Insurance Corporation of India against large loans. The shares were fictitious. In another instance, cash in hand of a group company was transferred to the managing agent on account of a payment by a buyer company that was fictitious. 44 In yet another instance, allegedly fictitious shares of a group company were transferred to another group company against loan. Mundhra faced prosecution on these counts and was briefly jailed. The same fate befell Dalmia for similar offences. But the Dalmia prosecution was complicated by the fact that he, by then a newspaper magnate, did not get along with Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru. There was a suspicion that the prosecution case had political weight behind it.
In May 1958, the Government of India took over the management of Jessop and Co. The third major episode of shock acquisition involved the group known as Surajmull Nagarmull. Surajmull Jalan and Nagarmull Bajoria were related by marriage. Both were traders of Calcutta in the 1930s, and owned extensive real estate.
In the 1940s, the combined group appears to have moved into jute manufacturing.
Family owned managing agency firm Howrah Trading managed Naskarpara Jute Mill near Calcutta. Between 1948 and 1951, the combined group attracted the attention of the income tax authorities for tax evasion. They were among several jute trading firms that had allegedly over-invoiced imports of raw jute from East Pakistan. 45 Chiranji
Lal Bajoria, son of Nagarmull, was the head of the estate then. 46 Despite an attempt at an enquiry, the suspicious death and disappearance of two close associates, and a discussion of the case in the Parliament, nothing came of the allegations. Henderson to form the new company. From a remark of the tax authorities that "the respondent and the transferee were directly connected," it appears that Mehta was already in control of Jardine Skinner. Later history of the factory remains unclear.
Jardine Henderson is still with the Mehta family, but specializes in pest control.
Whether because of the adverse publicity that the shock acquisitions received in press or more resolve on the part of the larger managing agency groups to continue in India, the 1960s saw fewer predatory takeovers. But this was also the decade when manufacturing industry as a whole faced difficulties.
III. 1960-1970: DIVERGENT PATHS
Even in the 1960s, there were cases of predatory takeovers, usually involving isolated groups and firms. The threat was never far away, and was a factor behind restructuring in some of the major firms. An actual takeover involved the Calcutta Landing and Shipping Company Ltd., which ran a stevedore business. Its managing agents were Gladstone, Lyall. It appears that around 1960, a Marwari family named Mohta part owned the company, and that this was the result of an understanding between the British managing agents and the Mohtas. A High Court appeals suit filed by these two parties alleged that another group, Jatia, had acquired shares in the late 1950s in order to take control of the company, that they eventually entered the board, depressed the dividend payment in order to reduce share value and acquire more shares, and having taken a significant interest, raised dividends to reward themselves.
The appellants also alleged that the directors raised expenses even as incomes fell, and siphoned off assets. None of the allegations could be substantiated and the appeal was dismissed. The court concluded that "the petition was the result of rivalry between two groups of shareholders in the matter of administration of the company's affairs." Yule, and demanded takeover of the management in 1968. The company's response to the threat was an extraordinary resolution passed to amalgamate the company with three others. Lohia and company filed a suit trying to prevent this and lost. Similar cases came up with other firms too, as we shall see. There was, however, a difference in the level of the threat. Unlike jute or coal, wherein production was organized in large employment units, the production of tea was split up into many gardens, and companies that owned these could lose a few or sell a few of these, while still remaining in the business. Munnalal Bhalotia and Co., to have the financial capacity to acquire the shares they did without the backing of some secret agency." 56 The name of the secret backer was not revealed. Despite the similarity in their stories, the Indo-British firms were distinctive on two points, the transfer of control that many of them underwent, and their particular vulnerability to the closed economic system adopted by the Indian state after 1947. Why did closure matter to the Indo-British firms in particular?
IV. BUSINESS AND POLITICS 1950 -1970 The business environment in these two decades was dominated by the nationalist state. Policy directives, legal reforms, and public discourse on policy did not discriminate foreign firms too much, even welcomed their entry. The new MNC entrants that had scaled the tariff wall to do business with Indian consumers profited from the environment. The announced policy and explanations by Ministers were positive towards foreign capital. Prime Minister Nehru had a known antipathy towards Dalmia, and dealt with Mundhra sternly. Direct restraints on existing foreign firms could not in any case be either strict or sustained in the 1950s because of repeated shortages of foreign exchange. 66 These features of the time tend to reinforce the hypothesis that the older exporting firms declined of their own failings, that while the newer firms profited from their adaptability to the Indian conditions, the older firms went bankrupt because they failed to adapt to these conditions.
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That inference is not a satisfactory one for three reasons. First, the suggestion that the older firms had a structural or inherited inability to adapt to India is not compelling given their 100-150 years history of doing business in the region. interests," Matthews concluded, "run parallel leading them to the logical conclusion that the British must get out." No matter the stated policy, no major political figure is known to have disputed this sentiment among Indian capitalists.
The sentiment produced reaction in British business circles in London and
Calcutta. In a report on India prepared in 1956, the leading chamber of commerce in Britain praised the Indian Government for pursuing socialism without discriminating against private enterprise, and then criticised India's politicians for using "socialist pattern of society" as a "shibboleth" to justify every expansion of the state and for a "pejorative, and frequently downright hostile" stance towards foreign firms. "It should be easy," the report went, "for foreign observers to receive the impression that India was a thoroughly unsuitable field for investment." 77 The report preserved the most strident attack with respect to the older industries and trading firms. "By and large, since Indian independence, the previously established British mercantile community have been fighting a rearguard action against an encroaching Government, rising 76 Herbert L. Matthews, "India Challenges British Finance," Current History (pre-1986), 3, 1943, pp. 496-8. 77 Garvin, Survey, p. 32. To some extent, foreign opinion on business-politics relation was coloured by three major acts of nationalisation after independence -Indian Airlines, life insurance, and Imperial Bank of India. The three steps did not form parts of a concerted socialist programme. Indian Airlines was nationalized because its expansion would have required large government support anyway. Life insurance was nationalized because of a series of scandals in Indian-owned insurance companies. Imperial Bank was nationalised to facilitate supply of rural credit. conducted by a faculty member of the University of Glasgow is revealing. 81 Fourteen large British firms were approached for feedbacks for this survey, about six responded. 82 The tone of the responses was one of uncertainty, not over stated policy, over the potential use of tax, exchange, and work permit rules as deterrent, in short, the use of regulatory instruments against foreign firms. "Although Government's policy, as repeatedly stated," the response from Dunlop went, "is to encourage foreign investment, in practice numerous conditions and controls become major irritants to the would-be investor.." The response stressed "the aversion of the Indian the response from English Card Clothing, the point of emphasis was "distrust." The "Indian government's distrust of the foreigner breeds a mutual distrust of the Indian government by the foreigner." The response also mentioned that the prospect of "communism on Burmese and Ceylonese models" was a deterrant to further investment in India. J. and P. Coats stressed indirect restraints through taxation, remittance of dividends, and employment of foreign nationals. Other responses brought up more or less the same issues.
Concerns like these were publicly discussed in a conference organized by the Indian Government in 1968, apparently to mollify foreign investors in the wake of an exchange crisis. Bitter complaints were raised about taxation, and mixed feelings were expressed about the Indianization thrust upon foreign corporates. The foreign firms complained that Indianization, while necessary and acceptable, did not help skill formation in an isolationist environment where trade and investment were restricted too. "Restrictions on foreign travel have tended to insulate people from contacts with foreigners and thereby denied the .. realisation of their truly cosmopolitan outlook.
This in turn limited and impaired the availability of suitable candidates for recruitment to the higher posts," one delegate stated.
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V. CONCLUSION
The paper described an episode of mass decline and bankruptcy of IndoBritish firms of Calcutta after they underwent a change of ownership and control. It is argued here that the transfer did contribute to decline, directly by making opportunistic use of internal resources more likely, and indirectly by making continuity in business strategy difficult to maintain due to threats of takeover and adverse government policy.
The economic policy of the Nehru era exposed the Indo-British firms to an unprecedented set of challenges. These firms were highly reliant on sourcing capital and managerial labour from the international markets, which routes were cut off.
Against increasing vulnerability, opportunistic takeover bids became more likely, and
Marwari capitalists played a bigger role than before in the management of these firms.
These two things, Marwari enterprise and opportunism were sometimes connected, but not always connected. made making long-term plans much more difficult for many firms. Whatever the precise mechanism relating transfer with poor performance, the result was disastrous for business in Calcutta. Few of the affected companies could sustain profits, and shareholder interest was compromised on a large scale.
Did the poor protection of shareholder interest represent a failure of law?
When discussing cases of transfer, the judges in the highest courts sometimes rued that law had failed to protect capital from predation and opportunism. Where precisely did law fall short? Two ideas seem to emerge from the legal sources. First, the managing agency system allowed an owner to manipulate the agency contract in such a way that it became impossible for minority shareholders to intervene.
Secondly, a rapid burst of company formation around Indian independence created a particular environment of opportunism that legal reform was unable to keep up with. 
